Briefing Paper:
An Overview of Prisoner Reentry in New Jersey
By Nancy FishmanJuly 9, 2002
|
Briefing Paper:By Nancy Fishman |
Why is it so important to look at reentry now? First, as described in more detail below, New Jersey, like the rest of the nation, has experienced a dramatic rise over the past twenty-five years in both the rate of incarceration and the absolute number of individuals in our jails, prisons and youth detention facilities, with significant financial implications for the state. All but a very few of those incarcerated will return to their communities, and they will do so having served, on average, longer sentences with minimal rehabilitative programming. They return, for the most part, to poor and working class urban neighborhoods that are already under considerable strain. Last year, one third of those released in New Jersey returned to those neighborhoods without any post-release supervision. Once released, ex-offenders face significant barriers to obtaining employment, housing, medical care and other basic necessities, and recidivism rates are alarmingly high.
In light of the size, severity and cost of these problems, concerns about the effects of incarceration and the success or failure of prisoners reentering the community can no longer be considered solely a criminal justice policy issue. Along with public safety worries and significant fiscal implications for both state and local budgets, the difficulty of successfully managing prisoner reintegration on a large scale presents serious challenges to urban revitalization efforts and the economic development potential of the state as a whole. A more comprehensive approach to the problem is needed, and such an approach must begin with a look at what we know, and what we don't.
In addition, the evidence suggests that neither the public nor policy makers believe that our current approaches to incarceration and rehabilitation are working. A national poll released this year by the Open Society Institute, for example, found significant support for prevention and rehabilitation as crime fighting strategies.1 Almost two-thirds of the respondents agreed that "the best way to reduce crime is to rehabilitate prisoners by requiring education and job training," twice as many as supported long prison sentences to incapacitate prisoners.2 The poll also found that three quarters of those surveyed favored supervised mandatory drug treatment and community service rather than prison time for those convicted of drug possession and minor drug sales offenses.3 These results and other indicators suggest greater public support for criminal justice policies which are not just "tough on crime" but which fairly and effectively increase public safety and reduce recidivism.
With these needs and opportunities in mind, and in the interests of expanding the conversation about what can and should be done to meet the challenge of prisoner reentry, we have prepared this brief overview of the state of our knowledge about reentry nationally and here in New Jersey. The section on national data draws heavily from work done by the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., which has taken the lead in reentry research and in raising the profile of prisoner reentry as an issue with broad implications in multiple policy arenas. If we don't know enough about the reentry picture nationally, we know even less about reentry in New Jersey, a research gap that will have to be addressed. This paper draws from existing public records, articles and interviews.
The National Picture
As long as there have been prisons, prisoners who have served their time have been returning to the community. Prisoner reentry has always been a challenge, implicating public safety and government budgets as well as the lives of victims, former prisoners, their families and communities. What makes the issue of so much current significance has to do with large scale changes in who we incarcerate, in what numbers, under what conditions, and how, in the end, we release them, and where.
Between 1970 and 2000, the number of people incarcerated in state and federal prisons in the United States grew from just under 200,000 to just over 1.3 million (plus another 600,000 or so in local jails, and over 100,000 in youth detention facilities)4. The rate of incarceration, meaning the number of people incarcerated per 100,000 in the population, increased fivefold during that thirty year period, from 96 to 4785. By comparison, the prior thirty-year period had seen a net increase in the number of people incarcerated of only about 20,000, and the rate of incarceration had actually dropped by twenty-seven percent6. At its most simple level, the issue of prisoner reentry and reintegration has gained prominence because of this numerical story: more people going into the system means more people are coming out. More than 600,000 individuals will be released from state and federal prisons this year, at least 1,600 per day, with more coming out of local jails and juvenile facilities.7
The story, however, is more complicated than just those numbers. While the correctional population has continued to grow over the last ten years, and with it the number of people released from prison, the rate of release has not kept pace. Beginning in 1991, the ratio of released prisoners to the population in prison has declined considerably, suggesting what Bureau of Justice (BJS) statistics generally confirm, that the average time served in prison has increased8. In addition, not only have prisoners who are being released now been incarcerated longer on average, but also a larger percentage of prisoners have served longer terms9. These statistical trends reflect changes in policy: the mid to late 1970s onward saw an ideological and political shift away from indeterminate sentencing and discretionary parole, and toward an increase in severity, accelerated by the "War on Drugs," leading to implementation of mandatory minimum sentences, truth-in-sentencing laws, "three-strikes" laws, sex offender community notification, and similar measures10. All have contributed to more people in more prisons for longer periods of time, meaning that more are being released after being away from their communities for increasingly extended time periods.
The release population also contains a larger percentage of "churners," those who have already failed once on parole and been readmitted to prison, and released again, compared to ten years ago. In 1998, 36 percent of released prisoners were being released for the second time on the same sentence11. In fact, churners are the fastest growing category of prison admissions: parole revocations jumped from 18 percent in 1980 to over one third of all admissions by the late 1990s.12
Prisoners are now also less likely to succeed on parole: in 1980, 70 percent of parolees completed their parole terms, but by 1998, only 45 percent were successful13. We know surprisingly little about why failures are more common now, although hypotheses abound. Funding for parole departments has not kept pace with the increase in the prison population, resulting in almost doubled caseloads for parole officers and consequently considerably less supervision - the average is less than two, fifteen minute meetings per month for the 80 percent who are not involved in some kind of intensive supervision14. At the same time, advances in surveillance technology and drug testing make detecting technical violations easier, and twice as many parole violators are returned for technical violations as for new crimes15. Parole failure may also be a reflection of the same tough-on-crime laws noted above, the lack of reentry planning, or any combination of these factors.
While the number of offenders on parole has more than tripled in the last twenty years, the rate of increase has slowed in the past ten years because more people are being released unconditionally, without any post-release supervision, after serving most of their sentences. Almost a quarter of all released prisoners in 1998 had "max-ed out" in prison, up from about 13 percent in 1990 (there is considerable variation across the states). We don't know whether unconditional releases do better than those who are supervised16. We do know, however, that those who "max out" are usually the most serious offenders, those who have shown least willingness to engage in the programs and behavior that earn good time credits towards an early release17.
Complicating the picture further, an increasing number of those released are being released for the first time in their lives: about 44 percent of soon-to-be released prisoners in 1997 fell into this category, up from 39 percent six years earlier, suggesting a general expansion in the population experiencing incarceration. Researchers at the Urban Institute calculated that more than half of those first-time prisoners don't return to prison, implying that the ranks of prisoners are being filled by more first-timers. Efforts to prevent recidivism will not address the problems caused by the expansion of incarceration18. More and more new people are becoming prisoners.
Other changes in the release population are worth noting. While the percentage of released prisoners who were convicted of more serious, violent offenses remained stable throughout the 1990s, at about 25 percent, the absolute number has increased and is likely to increase even more in the coming years, because releases have not kept pace with admissions19. Both the absolute number and the percentage of those released who were convicted of drug offenses increased during the 1990s, with the percentage reaching 32 percent by 199820.
Most released prisoners will not have participated in educational, vocational or pre-release programming and the overall rate of participation has declined, largely due to a decline in the availability of such programs21. The 1990s in particular saw significant decrease in funding for programming, through "tough-on-crime" measures such as the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which denied prisoners access to Pell Grants, spurring similar retrenchment at the state level. In 1996, for example, almost $22 billion was spent on prison construction, staff and maintenance of facilities and prisoners, but only 6 percent of that amount was spent on education, job training, treatment and similar program activities22. This is particularly troublesome because the majority of prisoners enter prison with substance abuse problems, but only 10 percent reported receiving treatment in 1997, compared to 25 percent in 199123.
National statistics also show that the reentry population is increasingly geographically concentrated; as more prisoners are released, they are more likely to return to a relatively small number of neighborhoods located in core counties (counties containing the central city of a metropolitan area)24. Research suggests that these neighborhoods are either poor or working class25. Whatever the overall impact of the reentry of an expanding group of prisoners who have served longer sentences, with little rehabilitative programming and minimal supervision or assistance on release, these neighborhoods will probably be the most affected.
Unfortunately, these are also communities already stretched for resources and in many ways least capable to facilitate the successful reintegration of former prisoners. In a series of papers commissioned by the Vera Institute on "The Unintended Consequences of Incarceration," the authors highlight both the potentially disabling effect on communities of high rates of incarceration - including increases in crime as community ties are weakened and prison is demystified, and further economic instability for individual families and the community as a whole from the initial loss of an earning member, and his or her decreased earning power upon release26 - and also the dearth of research which specifically documents these effects27. We do know, however, that low-income urban communities have lost labor market share to the suburbs, creating a "spatial mismatch" between jobs and the inner city residents who need them, including ex-offenders. These areas are also likely to contain a high percentage of former welfare recipients competing for the same jobs as released prisoners28. Moreover, these home communities present particular challenges for individuals trying to avoid the people and places associated with past drug use and criminal activity.
On a national level, then, the challenge of prisoner reintegration increased in both scale and severity, exacerbated by public policy that expanded incarceration while reducing the capacity of the communities, programs and systems managing reentry. On an individual level, ex-prisoners face significant barriers to successful reentry. According to an Urban Institute review of the reentry population, "of the nearly 600,000 inmates returning to communities across the country each year, most have not completed high school, have limited employment skills, and have histories of substance abuse and health problems."29 Most, the study points out, entered prison with these problems as well. In addition, prisoners serving longer sentences have more attenuated family connections, which may hurt reintegration efforts30. Incarceration further reduces the employability of those with low educational attainment, low skills and minimal legitimate work history. A recent survey of employers in five major cities found that 65 percent of employers would not knowingly hire an ex-offender, and at least one third of these employers had checked the criminal histories of recently hired employees31. Former prisoners are banned from certain jobs and professions, and denied access to certain public benefits such as housing32. Multiplied by the large number of individuals emerging from prison each year, and concentrated in areas already hard hit by the panoply of challenges facing urban communities, these problems have implications not just for public safety (the context in which they usually arise) but also for federal, state and local budgets, for the economic health of states, municipalities and families.
The Reentry Challenge in New Jersey
The picture in New Jersey, while not as complete from a data and analysis perspective, is similar to that found in the nation as a whole. The state prison population has grown as it has nationally. In 1975, the number of adult inmates was just under 600033. By 1990, there were close to 17,000 adults and juveniles in state custody; by 2000, the number had reached over 28,000 (a slight decline from the year before)34. According to the 2000 Census, there were 47,941 people in correctional facilities in the state, including federal and state prisons, county facilities, and halfway houses; in 1990, the census count had found 18,848 incarcerated in the state35. New Jersey has had some form of mandatory minimum sentencing since the criminal code was revised in 1979, and about half of the inmates serving time over the past ten years have done so with mandatory minimums. The median sentence term for the past ten years, according to the Department of Corrections (DOC), has been six to seven years, but almost half are committed with a sentence of between three and five years. Four percent are serving life sentences, and significantly less than one percent are on death row; in other words, 96 percent of all state inmates will eventually be released. New Jersey prisons are historically overcrowded. In 1981, Governor Brendan Byrne stated that prison overcrowding had reached crisis proportions, and declared a "temporary" state of emergency that has never really been lifted36. Last year, The New York Times reported that New Jersey had the most crowded prison system in the country, according to the Justice Department, operating at 143 percent of capacity37. Still, the number of prisoners released annually has almost doubled since 1990, going from 8945 in that year to 16,032 last year38.
The percentage of prisoners convicted of violent crimes39 decreased over the 1990s, starting at 52 percent of inmates in 1990 and reaching about 40 percent by 2000, but the absolute number of violent offenders in state facilities has increased, from 8784 in 1990 to 11,513 in 2000. There was a slight increase in the percentage incarcerated for drug-related offenses40, from 30 percent in 1990 to 34 percent in 2000, but the absolute number of drug offenders almost doubled, from 5142 in 1990 to 9683 in 2000. In all facilities except the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center, which holds convicted sex offenders, the majority of inmates were convicted of drug-related offenses.
Similar to the picture of core county concentration drawn at the national level, data from the New Jersey DOC reveals that 20 to 25 percent of all state prison inmates come from Essex County; this proportion has been consistent over the past ten years, and is the same for both adults and juveniles, and by most types of crimes (except for sex offenses, which are fairly evenly distributed across the state). Overall, residents of fewer than half of the counties in New Jersey have made up 70 to 80 percent of inmates. Released prisoners will face similar barriers to finding employment as other low-income Essex County residents in cities like Newark, Irvington and East Orange, compounded by the impact of incarceration and the concentration of characteristics common in those who end up in prison, such as lack of education, skills and work experience and substance abuse problems.
While we know something about who is in New Jersey prisons, analyses of the New Jersey reentry and recidivating populations comparable to those done at the federal level by the DOJ and The Urban Institute do not appear to have been done recently41. The DOC estimates that although the number of halfway houses in use has more than doubled in recent years, only a small percentage of inmates will go through that step before release42. The rest either max out on their sentences or are released on parole. Under the 1997 No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. § 2C:43-7.2, those convicted of certain violent crimes are required to serve at minimum 85 percent of their imposed sentences before being eligible for parole, which has decreased the amount of time spent under parole supervision after release43. In fact, a recent article in the Star-Ledger provided some startling statistics about those being released from New Jersey state prisons. Since 1990, the percentage of prisoners being released into the community without any parole supervision has more than doubled, from 13 percent in 1990 to fully one-third of all released inmates in 200144.
Far more people are under probation supervision than are actually confined to institutions. In 2000, there were approximately 67,000 adults and 14,000 juveniles on probation. While the state took over the probation system from the counties in 1996, and increased the overall amounts spent on probation, the number of probation officers has not risen enough to meet the size of this population: there were only 452 probation officers, with about 150 cases each, supervising the adult population, and 200 officers for the juvenile population, an average of 70 cases per officer45. Supervision in such circumstances is acknowledged to be minimal, and the police reportedly made 24,000 arrests of probationers for new crimes per year46. Complaints about this situation resulted in state senate hearings in 2001, and protests by probation officers, who had worked without a contract for 2 years47. The Administrative Office of the Courts has pushed for more funding to ameliorate the case overload problems, and apparently funding for additional officers was included in the proposed 2002 budgets; whether those positions have been filled, and whether they might be a casualty of the budget crisis, is unclear. The probation department is part of the AOC, which limits its ability to do much more than collect money and enforce court orders. There has been some push to move probation into a separate executive agency.
Funding for prison programming in New Jersey, as across the nation, has not kept pace with the rise in the prison population. In 1997, the Corrections Education Task Force, convened by the State Employment and Training Commission, reported that only 1 to 2.5 percent of the Department of Corrections budget was spent on education, although approximately 75 percent of those incarcerated performed at the two lowest literacy levels. Most of the funding was directed at juveniles. According to information provided by the Office of Educational Services, about 21 to 23 percent of those in state prisons and juvenile facilities participated in either academic or vocational programming each year since 1995 (the earliest year for which they reported that data was available). Participation rates for the adult population are presumably lower, as these figures include juveniles for whom educational programming is mandated. The Task Force report indicated that all educational programs had waiting lists. Post-secondary education is at present almost non-existent; a federal grant has underwritten Project IN-SIDE (Inmate Network: Skills in Developing Employment), which provides certificate-granting training courses for inmates under 25 within 5 years of parole, by contract with Union and Mercer County Community Colleges48. Programming at halfway houses is more significant, but only a small percentage of those in prison will pass through the halfway houses.
While money for programming is scarce, the DOC has made some efforts recently to adjust its vocational programming to better reflect job opportunities on the outside, according to DOC personnel. There have been three recent job fairs within the prisons, although the figures for how many inmates got jobs from these job fairs are not available. Inmates at the prisons and in halfway houses can participate in work release programs; there is no data to indicate whether these lead to permanent employment upon release. There is, at present, no organized release planning; reportedly, inmates who attempt to plan for themselves are effectively penalized because of the uncertainty of parole; they lose the jobs and housing leads that they may have arranged because parole release is denied or delayed. In terms of family reintegration assistance, the DOC indicated that they provided some parenting classes, but nothing that actively involved family members. As in many other states, the DOC contract with AT&T adds a surcharge to prisoners' collect phone calls, placing an additional burden on family contact.
Although attention to and funding for drug treatment for those in state institutions or contract facilities has increased considerably over the past ten years, the need still far outstrips current resources. The push for treatment in prison, and for treatment as an alternative to prison, began in the early 1990s in New Jersey, as the number of drug offenders increased and initiatives around the country began to explore options for addressing the problem. In New Jersey, the Sentencing Policy Study Commission surveyed prisoners in 1993 and found that a quarter of all respondents were incarcerated for selling drugs, and almost one quarter had committed crimes to get money for drugs; one third reported unsuccessfully seeking treatment in prison49. While widespread belief in the importance of treatment did not produce a radical change in policy - especially given the tough-on-crime context of New Jersey in the 1990s - more treatment options now exist. In 2001, for example, there were 1359 therapeutic community beds in six different prisons, up from 329 as recently as 1998. The DOC reported, however, that there was still a waiting list for those slots of 200 to 500 people at any point in time50. Five counties now have drug courts, which offer treatment and intensive court and probation supervision as an alternative to prison, and this model is scheduled to expand throughout the state51. Those in the treatment community on the outside note that there is no consistent continuum of care for those transitioning from prison to halfway houses back to the community, which places returning addicts at high risk.
While there is not as much analysis and information about the reentry challenge in New Jersey, compared to what has been done at the national level, what we do know suggests that the situation in the state seems to fit with national trends. Additional research and analysis should form a part of any state strategy to begin addressing the problem.
